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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

"Tis against some mens' principle to pay interest, and seems against others interest to pay
the principle." Benjamin Franklin. Appellant Norman Wechsler ("Debtor') is the Respondent
Sharon Wechler's ("Creditor") fonner spouse. The two divorced ten (10) years ago in New York
and now, a decade later, and on the other side of the country, Creditor is still attempting to
collect what is 1ightfully hers. For years Creditor has "looked under rocks," examined leads
found by private investigators, and chased Debtor around the country in attempt to obtain her
share of the marital assets ordered to be paid to her. After a couple of years of Debtor falling off
the map, Creditor once again caught up to Debtor, this time in Pocatello, Idaho of all places.
Even after a New York Receiver was ordered to take control of Debtor's interests in various
third-party entities he either controls or has interest therein, even after seizing his $1.8 million
dollar home in Crested Butte, Colorado, even after garnishing over $80,000.00 from his bank
accounts in Idaho, Debtor still refuses to satisfy the judgments entered against him by the New
York court.

In this case, Judge Nye was correct when he wrote, "The continuing refusal,

constant delays, and evasive action, spanning almost 10 years, must stop. A judgment has been
entered and must be fulfilled."
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 3, 2006, a Divorce Judgment involving Creditor a11d Debtor was entered in
the office of the New York County Clerk. R., p. 12. On May 27, 2014, a Judgment relating to
the parties divorce was entered by the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New
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1 13.

The May 27, 2014 Judgment was filed as a foreign judgment in Idaho on March 10, 2015, and is
the judgment which Creditor has been attempting to collect upon in the proceedings which fonn
the subject matter of this appeal. R., pp. 8-15.
Preceding the entry of the May 27, 2014, Judgment, the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, County of New York, entered other judgments in favor of Creditor and against
Debtor on August 21, 2006, in the amount of $17,669,678.57, on January 5, 2007, in the amount
of$1,007,029.92, and on September 2, 2008, in the amount of$3,196,072.27. R., pp. 231-257.
Those judgments have been filed as foreign judgments in Idaho; though, Creditor has yet to
initiate collection proceedings in Idaho relative to these three (3) judgments.
In May 2013, the New York comi detennined Debtor "possesses direct and beneficial
interests in certain assets, including being the sole member of CYB Master LLC, which is a
holding company for several additional companies, including CYB Penn, LLC; CYB Rave,
LLC; CYB Trym, LLC; CYB Morph, LLC; CYBio, LLC; C Partners or C Ventures, CYB IC,
LLC; and CPS Holdings, and it also holds an interest in CPS Technologies, Corp. and stock in
Intellicorp, Inc." R., p. 55; See also R., p. 77. (Chart depicting Debtor's relationship with these
entities.); See also R., p. 91,

,r 6,

Ex. 9, pp. 97-104 ("I am the sole member of CYB Master,

LLC." Colorado Debtor Exam excerpts of Debtor describing his relationship ,vith the above
noted entities.); See also R., 117, p. 14, lines 2-5 (Debtor admits he is President of Wechsler &
Co.). The Affidavit of Louis E. Black in Support of Motion to Compel has attached therewith
multiple documents obtained in post-judgment discovery that identify Debtor's interests in these
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18,

10

were:
RAVELLC
\Vechsler & Company

32,367,112 Common Units

725 Preferred Units

CYB RAVE LLC

3,262,387 Common Units

1100 Preferred Units

Nonnan \Vechsler

625,948 at 0.0998485/unit Wa1Tants

INTELLICORP
Wechsler & Co., Inc. 998,200.00 Equity/Shares $6,707,000.00 LoawNotes $158,058.54 Interest
CYB IC LLC 200,000.00 Equity/Shares $1,218,000.00 Loan/Notes $17,926.37 Interest

PERMLIGHT PRODUCTS. INC.
Wechsler & Co., Inc.

95 Shares Series A Preferred 1750 Shares Series A-1 Preferred

CYBPennLLC

1204 Shares Series A Preferred 715 Shares Series A-1 Preferred

Nonnan J. \Vechsler

16 Shares Series A-1 Prefe1Ted

R., pp. 94-104.

Because of Debtor's interests in these entitites, the New York court detennined the
circumstances were sufficient to justify the appointment of a Receiver over Debtor's assets and
CYB Master, LLC in order to sell, dispose of, or otherwise liquidate Debtor's assets or interests
in these various entities. R., pp. 55-59. The court further ordered, Inter-Alia, that the Receiver
had authority "[t]o take custody, control and possession of all Receivership Property and records
relevant thereto from the Receivership Defendants." R., p. 57. The New York court did not
require the Receiver to post bond or give an undertaking of any type. R., p. 60. Furthennore,
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extent

to

exceeded

Receivership Property available to make such payments. R., p. 61.
recently as January 2016, and as evidenced by the Docket Sheet in the Bankruptcy
Petition of VVechsler & Co., petition No. 10-23719-rdd, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York (White Plains), Debtor, purporting to be acting as Manager of
CYB Master, LLC was offering to exchange shares of CPS Teclmologies Corp. for Wechsler &
Co.'s interests in Intellicorp, Inc., in spite of the New York Receivership order. R., pp. 91-92, ,T
7, pp. 105-109.
In March of 2012, Creditor attempted to collect on the above-noted $17 million dollar
judgment by executing upon Debtor's real property located in Mt. Crested Butte, Colorado.

Augmented R., 15.04.16 A.ff. of Norman J Wechsler in Supp. ofMot. To Quash or Dismiss Action
on Foreign J, p. 2, ,i 7.

Creditor was able to obtain that property tln·ough a bid of

$1,823,084.50. However, Creditor's Judgment remained unsatisfied. Id. All the while, litigation
in the divorce continued in New York, and on May 27, 2014, the Judgment, which is the focus of
this appeal, was entered by the New York court. R., pp. 12-13. In the May 2014 New York
litigation, Debtor was represented by counsel and represented to the New York court his address
to be 17 Timberland Drive, Crested Butte, Colorado, even though that property was seized by
Creditor in 2012. R., p. 13. This was Debtor's last known address to Creditor at the time the
Judgment was domesticated in Idaho. Augmented R., 15.03.10 Aff. of Filing Foreign J., pp. 1-3.
After leaving Colorado, Debtor evidently moved to New Mexico. R., pp. 116 (p. 9, lines
15-19), 188 ,i 7. After living in New Mexico, Debtor then moved again
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1

'ii 7.

5,

a

Execution and garnished two of Debtor's bank accounts, yielding $81,507.08 collected by
Creditor. Augmented R., 15.03.17 Order For FVrit of Execution and Garnishment, 15.07.01
Amended Decision and Order on Claim of Exemption.

On September 16, 2015, Creditor

conducted a Debtor's Exam of Debtor. R., pp. 113-140. During this exam, Debtor admitted he
keeps his personal business records in his house in Pocatello, Idaho. R., p. 127, p. 54, lines 2324. \Vhen Debtor was asked where the records for CYB Master, LLC were kept, he replied,
"Hither and yon." R., p. 129, p. 62, lines 5-6. He then stated some may be in his computer. Id.
at 129, p. 62, lines 14-15. Debtor \Vas asked if he caused any CYB entity to transfer any money
or other property to any other individual or entity during the past three years. R., pp. 132-134,
pp. 71-79. He refused to answer and his counsel encouraged him to not answer. Id. VVhen
Debtor was asked about life insurance policies, he answered that information about those policies
were on a computer in his home, owned by IntelliCorp, for which he is a director. R., p. 135, p.
83, lines 1-10.
Upon conclusion of the Debtor's Exam, counsel for Creditor served upon Debtor a
Subpoena

Duces Tecum.

R., pp. 141-44.

This subpoena commanded Debtor to produce

materials relating to his assets, business and investment matters, including his financial interests
in third party entities. Id. On October 14, 2015, counsel for Debtor \Vrote to counsel for Creditor
and advised that Debtor would not be producing the infonnation pertaining to Debtor's business
or investment matters pertaining to third party entities, claiming Debtor "does not own or have a
right to produce these documents." R., p. 145. See also R., p. 150.
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15,

to

Creditor wrote to counsel for Debtor, citing I.R.C.P. 34(a) and 45(b), and requested the
documents and mate1ials that are in Debtor's possession, custody or for which he has a legal
right to obtain upon demand, be produced. R., pp. 152-53. As noted above, Debtor testified in
his Debtor Exam his various roles and involvement in third party entities and that he had
documentation and property regarding such involvement, in his home. On January 7, 2016,
counsel for Debtor responded to counsel for Creditor and advised he would not be producing the
requested items, materials, and infonnation. R., pp. 154-55. In support of his refusal to tum over
the requested documentation and materials, counsel for Debtor wrote, "[B]ecause Mr. Wechsler
is the custodian of third party property does not extinguish the third paiiy' s rights, and turning
such property over to you would be illegal and unethical." Id. at 155.

C.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELO\V
On March 28, 2016, Creditor filed her Motion to Compel Responses to Debtor Exam

Questions. R., pp. 64-66. In this motion, Creditor sought the court's order, commanding Debtor
to answer certain questions pertaining to his financial interest in the third paiiy entities he is
affiliated with. Additionally, Creditor sought the court's order, commanding Debtor to provide
complete answers and responses to Creditor's subpoena.

Creditor simultaneously filed

Plaintiff's ~Memorandum in Support ofAfotion to Compel. R., pp. 75-89. The Affidavit of Louis
E. Black in Support of lvfotion to Compel was also filed therewith. R., pp. 90-109. Also on

March 28, 2016, Creditor filed Plaintiff's A1otion to Appoint Ancillmy Receiver, R., pp. 156-57,
and her supporting 11-1emorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Ancillmy
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pp.

was to

court

an

receiver to marshall assets and property of the Debtor located within the state of Idaho. R., p.
156.
In response to the filing of these pleadings, Debtor filed Debtor's Motion to Strike
Affidavit of Louis E. Black, R., pp. 173-76, Debtor's 1i1otion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's
Memorandum ofLaw in Support of Plaintiff's }.lotion to Appoint Ancillary Receiver, R., pp. 177-

180, Declaration of Norman Wechsler, R., pp. 18 7-92, and A1emorandum in Support of Response
to Motion to Compel and .Motion to Appoint Ancilla,y Receiver, R., pp. 181-86. The thrust of

Debtor's responses to Creditor's motions was that Creditor was inappropriately attempting to
pierce the corporate veil and attempting to get Debtor to breach his fiduciary duties with the third
party entities he is affiliated with. See R., pp.181-86.
On May 11, 2016, the court entered its Decision on A1otion to Compel, Motion to Appoint
Receiver, and 111otions to Strike. R., pp. 195-205. In this decision, the court ordered Debtor to:

present answers to questions asked during the debtor's exam in relation to the two
corporate entities owned by him. Furthennore, Norman is ordered to produce all
documents necessary for Sharon and the receiver to assess any and all assets that
may be used to satisfy the debt. Persistent refusal will result in contempt charges.
The continuing refusal, constant delays, and evasive action, spanning almost 10
years, must stop. A judgment has been entered and must be fulfilled.

R., p. 200.
The court then ordered David M. Smith be appointed as ancillary receiver to help
Receiver Joseph B. Nelson of New York in his fiduciary duties over CYB Master, LLC.
Id.
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is appointed
a court
a
other
that
which appointed the primary receiver. The ancillary receiver is not an agent of
the primary receiver, but rather answers to the local appointing court and is
directed to take possession of the debtor's property within the state, and if
necessary, remit it to the court which had original jurisdiction in the matter.

Id. at 201.
The court then went on and addressed Debtor's motions to strike. Debtor was seeking the
court's order to strike portions of Creditor's supporting memorandum, as well as portions of the

Affidavit of Louis E. Black in Support of Motion to Compel. R., p. 202. See also R., pp. 173-80.
The basis for Debtor's motions was that the affidavit contained hearsay and that Creditor's
memorandum contains "redundant, i1mnaterial, impertinent, or scandalous" material. R., pp.
202-03. In its decision, the dist1ict court held that the infonnation in the affidavit were emails
that described Debtor's interests in the various third party entities and such infonnation was
submitted as part of the post-judgment discovery process; not to be used for trial. R., p. 202.
Regarding the motion to strike portions of Creditor's brief, the comi wrote:
[\V]hile Nonnan points out that Sharon's brief contains "redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous" material, that is solely his opinion and nothing in the
rules prohibits a party from writing what they deem to be necessary for their case,
even if the other side disagrees. Nothing in Sharon's brief rises to the level of
warranting being stricken. Similar to Black's affidavit, the memo will be given
the weight to which it is entitled.

R., p. 203. On May 24, 2016, the court, pursuant to LC. §8-601, entered its Order Appointing
Ancillmy Receiver. R., pp. 206-210.
The Ancillary Receiver is hereby appointed an officer of the Court and granted
all of the powers authorized pursuant to Idaho Code §8-605, namely, the power,
under the control of the Court, to bring and defend actions in his own name, as
receiver; to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect
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compromise
same, to make
generally to do such acts respecting the property as the court may authorize.

All parties to this action are ordered to cooperate with and assist the Ancillary
Receiver in taking possession of the property described above. The past and/or
present officers, directors, agents, members, managers, general partners,
managing partners, trustees, attorneys, accountants, and employees of CYB
Master LLC, any of the "Receivership Defendants" identified in the Order
Appointing Receiver Pursuant to CPLR 5228, or any employee, officer, director,
or agent of any second-tier or subsequent-tier entity, are ordered to turn over to
the Ancillary Receiver forthwith all paper and electronic infonnation belonging to
and/or relating to CYB Master LLC, any of the "Receivership Defendants,"
and/or any second-tier or subsequent-tier entities or assets, in such maimer as the
A.ncillary Receiver may specify.
R., pp. 208-09. After the Court's entry ofthis order, Debtor filed his Objection and Response to
Plaintiff's Proposed Order Appointing Ancilla,y Receiver. R., pp. 211-213.

On June 8, 2016, Creditor filed an Ex Parte A1otionfor Tfrit of Assistance. R., 6/8/2016
p. 5. This motion sought the court's order directing the Bannock County Sheriff to assist the
Ancillary Receiver in taking possession of assets and records belonging to CYB Master LLC, or
any entity or asset in which CYB Master LLC may hold an interest of any kind that was believed
to be held in Debtor's home located in Pocatello, Idaho. Id. On June 8, 2016, the court issued
the FVrit of Assistance. Id. See also, Augmented R.16.06.20, Ex. 1. On June 16, 2016, the
Barmock County Sheriff, accompanyied by the Ancillary Receiver, served the Writ ofAssistance
on Debtor at his home. Augmented R., 16.06.20. The Debtor refused to cooperate with the
Ancillary Receiver or the Sheriff, and entry into his home was not made. Debtor refused to
produce any documents or things in response to the Writ. Id.
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a

on

to

Compel, 1'1otion to Appoint Receiver and ,\lotions to Strike and the Order Appointing Ancillmy
Receiver. R., pp. 214-18.

On June 17, 2016, Debtor filed his ,Motion for Stay of Enforcement of Orders,
accompanied by the Affidavit of Norman Wechsler. Augmented R., 16.06.17. On June 24, 2016,
Creditor filed her Objection to 1\fotionfor Stay of Enforcement of Orders and on June 29, 2016,
the court entered its Decision on .Motion to Stay and wrote, "This Motion is nothing more than
another attempt by \Vechsler to avoid his duties and waste the time and resources of the judicial
system.

In its discretion, the Comi DENIES Wechsler's Motion to Stay the Orders."

Augmented R., 16.06.24, R., pp. 221-22.

Due to Debtor's refusal to cooperate with the Sheriff or the Ancillary Receiver, on June
20, 2016, Creditor filed a Afotion for Contempt, along with the Affidavit ofAncillmy Receiver in

Support of Motion for Contempt. Augmented R., 16.06.20. Creditor alleged Debtor refused to

cooperate with the Ancillary Receiver's attempt to obtain documents or computer files belonging
to CYB Master LLC and thus sought court assistance due to Debtor's refusal to cooperate with
the Ancillary Receiver as ordered in the May 24, 2016, Order Appointing Ancilla,y Receiver. Id.
On June 20, 2016, Debtor filed his Objection to Plaintiff's FVrit of Assistance, alleging
the Writ "grants unconstitutionally wide ranging seizure authority to the Baimock County Sheriff
and the Receiver." Augmented R., 16.06.20 Debtor then submitted an exemplar Writ, seeking
the comi to amend the issued \Vrit to match that of the exemplar. Id. On June 24, 2016, Debtor
then filed his Amended Objection to Plaintiff's Writ of Assistance. Augmented R., 16.06.24.
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objection to the Writ. Id.
As previously discussed above, on June 29, 2016, the court issued its decision, denying
Debtor's motion to stay the enforcement of the court's orders. In response to that order, on July
7, 2016, Debtor submitted his Afotion for Stay of Enforcement of Orders to this Court.

Augmented R., 16.07.07. Following the filing of Creditor's response to this motion, on August 1,
2016, this Court entered its Order Denying Afotion for Stay of Enforcement of Orders. R., p.
223.
On July 18, 2016, a hearing was held on Creditor's Motion for Contempt. R., p. 258.
During that hearing, Debtor denied the motion and the court read Debtor his 1ights on the Motion
for Contempt. Id. Debtor's Motion for Stay was still then pending before this Court; thus a trial
date was not set. 1 Id. Also, Debtor raised an allegation of a conflict of interest between the
Ancillary Receiver and Creditor's counsel, due to Creditor's counsel filing the Motion for
Contempt on behalf of the Ancillary Receiver and the Ancillary Receiver being paid by the
Creditor. Id. The court then ordered the parties to submit briefing on this allegation. Id. On
July 25, 2016, Debtor filed his Statement of Affirmative Defenses Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 75 in
regards to the contempt allegation. Augmented R., 16.07.25.

1 As of the date of filing of this brief, Creditor's Motion for Contempt has yet to be heard by the District Court. A
hearing was scheduled in November 2016 but was re-scheduled due to the automatic stay that arose following
Debtor's filing of his Second Amended Notice ofAppeal. The hearing was then scheduled in December, 2016;
however the Ancillary Receiver did not make it to the hearing and a new hearing was scheduled for January 12,
2017.
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R.,

225-57.

Amended Notice of Appeal was filed pursuant to this Courts issuance of a Notice of Defect
issued, July 12, 2016, advising the decision being appealed was not appealable pursuant to I.A.R.

ll(a)(7).
On August 2, 2016, Creditor filed Plaintiffs Response Memorandum to Defendant's

.Motion Re. Receiver Conflict of Interest. Augmented R. 16.08.02. On August 5, 2016, Debtor
filed his Reply to PlaintijJ's Response Memorandum to Defendant's Court Ordered Briefing

Regarding Receiver Conflict of Interest. Augmented R., 16.08.05. On October 3, 2016, the
Court entered its Decision Re: Conflict of Interest. In its decision, the court held that Creditor
was required by its May 24, 2016, order to pay the Ancillary Receiver and then seek
reimbursement from assets seized, if available and appropriate. Id. at 3. Such a requirement as
ordered by the court, especially in light of the fact that Creditor is the party who requested the
Ancillary Receiver in this matter and therefore has a slightly more significant role in moving
forward, does not create an inherent conflict of interest. Id.
The Court then addressed the allegation of the conflict of interest due to Creditor filing
the Motion for Contempt on behalf of the Ancillary Receiver. Id. at 4. In its analysis the court
pointed out that the Ancillary Receiver had attempted to act on his court ordered obligations by
going to Debtor's home, but Debtor refused to allow him to fulfill his duties as ordered. Id. It
was due to Debtor's refusal to allow the Ancillary Receiver to perfonn his duties that the need
arose for court involvement. Id. The court clarified that counsel for Creditor does not represent
the Ancillary Receiver, the Ancillary Receiver was appointed by the court, and "sometimes legal
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matters must

not

be expected to go out and retain private counsel in order to effectuate the orders of the Court."
Id. "Vv1lile it may have been better to come directly to the Court, because the Court can initiate

contempt charges, the manner the receiver undertook does not preclude action or create a conflict
of interest. ... The fact that [Creditor's] attorney filed charges based on Jawwledge ji-om the
receiver on behalf of his client regarding the incident does not mean that Plaintiffs attorney

represents the receiver." Id. at 4-5. "Neither the payment structure in place, nor the filing of
contempt charges in behalf of Plaintiff based upon knowledge presented by the receiver create a
conflict of interest that is ineparable." Id. at 5.
Following the issuance of this decision by the court, on November 7, 2016, Debtor filed
his Second Amended Notice ofAppeal.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following are the issues on appeal as identified in Debtor's Second Amended Notice
of Appeal:
1.

The District Court ened when it ordered Appellant to remit property and

infonnation belonging to a third party as a result of an improper motion to compel by
[Respondent].
2.

It was inappropriate for the District Court to appoint an ancillary receiver in this

case. The appointment was made without statutory authority and was inappropriate because all
rights and authority over CYB Master were appointed

to Joseph B. Nelson, CPA of the

accounting firm ofBerdon LLP, New York, New York.
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6 and

2016, as

as

dependent Writ ofAssistance, violated Appellant's fundamental rights, including, but not limited
to, his rights to privacy under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Fifth Amendment rights
to due process and First Amendment Right to freedom of speech.
4.

Debtor was entitled to his attorney fees under I.R.C.P. 37(a)(4), as the ]vfotion to

Compel (CR 64-66) was filed improperly.
5.

It was inappropriate for the District Court to appoint an ancillary receiver in this

case without bond?
6.

The District Court erred when it considered hearsay, unsubstantiated and

scandalous infonnation without foundation in its Orders of May 11 (CR 195-205) and May 24,
2016 (CR 206-210).
7.

The District Court erred in its Decision Re: Conflict of Interest, entered on

October 3, 2016, in finding that a conflict did not exist as the result of Respondent paying
counsel to represent the Ancillary Receiver, communicating directly with the receiver ex-parte,
and paying the Ancillary Receiver directly.
8.

In all of its decisions in this case, the District Court failed to perceive or recognize

the issues as discretionary as required by Idaho case law.

III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Creditor is entitled to an award of her attorney fees on appeal pursuant to

I.A.R. 11.2 and I.A.R. 41?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The Court exercises free review over matters of law regarding filing of a foreign
judgment pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1301, et. seq." Int'! Real Estate Solutions, Inc. v. Arave,
340 P.3d 465, 468 (2014). The standard of review for questions of law is one of free review.
Ransom v. Topaz, 143 Idaho 641, 644, 152 P.3d 2, 5 (2006). "The control of discovery is within
the discretion of the trial court." Jacobson v. State Farm "~fut., 136 Idaho 171, 173, 30 P.3d 949,
951 (2001).
V. ARGUMENT
A.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT \VAS CORRECT IN COl\fPELLING
DEBTOR TO RESPOND TO DEBTOR EXAM QUESTIONS?

The district court properly granted the Creditor's motion to compel the Debtor to answer
debtor exam questions regarding his corporations, Wechsler and Company and CYB Masters,
LLC and their subsidiaries, as well as questions concerning his interest in the companies and
what assets can be used to satisfy the debt that he owes. Consequently, the district court did not
abuse its discretion regarding this matter.
First, the issue of whether a motion to compel is the appropriate remedy as compared to a
motion for contempt when a debtor does not comply with a debtor's exam pursuant to Rule 69
was not raised in the debtor's briefing below (R., pp. 181- 186), but was only briefly mentioned
at oral argument, without supporting authority, in front of the district court.

Reporter's

Transcript on Appeal, 04-25-16, p. 25, 11. 14-17. ("This is - - if there is such an action that they
would have any authority to bring, it would be a motion for contempt because he would be in
contempt of an order. It would not be a motion to compel."). Consequently, the Creditor did not

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Page 15

an

to

issue at the district court

therefore it was not properly raised below. No supporting authority was presented to the court,
and should not be considered on appeal. See Leader v. Reiner, 143 Idaho 635,637, 151 P.3d 831,
833 (2007) ("The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are
raised for the first time on appeal.").
Second, the Debtor's contention that a post-judgment debtor's examination under Rule 69
is not discovery governed by Rule 26 and is not subject to a motion to compel under Rule 37 is
not supported by law or fact. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 7. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
69 provides the methods that may be used to collect on a judgment, which includes the
"Obtaining of Discovery." I.R.C.P. 69(c) provides as follows:
(c) Obtaining discovery. In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment
creditor or successor in interest whose interest appears of record may obtain
discovery from any person, including the judgment debtor, as provided in these
rules and may examine any person, including the judgment debtor, in the
manner provided by these rules.
(Emphasis added). The examination of the judgment debtor, referred to colloquially as a "debtor
examination" is clearly included as "discovery" by Rule 69. The Rule also directs that the
examination of the judgment debtor is to be conducted "as provided by these rules," as is the
discovery. There is no other direction in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding a debtor
examination other than what is in Rule 69. Therefore, Rule 69's direction for an examination of
any person, including the judgment debtor, "in the manner provided by these rules" must refer to
depositions by oral examination as provided in I.R.C.P. 30. Indeed, even the Debtor admits in his
briefing that "[T]his process [A Rule 69 debtor's exam] is generally referred to as a deposition,
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's

9.

argues that a Rule 69 debtor's exam is not discovery as governed by Rule 26 and Rule 37,
despite the fact that a "deposition upon oral examination" is the first method of discovery listed
under Rule 26(a)(l). A Rule 69 debtor's examination is a deposition governed by Rule 26 and
Rule 30 and a motion to compel may therefore be applied under Rule 37.
Debtor concedes that a Rule 69 debtor's exam is a deposition governed by Rule 30. See
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 9. Dming an oral examination under Rule 30, a "person may
instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a p1ivilege, to enforce a
limitation ordered by the court or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(4)." I.R.C.P. 30(d)(l).
Attorney for the Debtor, however, objected and instructed his client not to respond without
asserting a privilege, enforcing a limitation ordered by the court, or moving to tenninate the
deposition under I.R.CP. 30(d)(4)(A). See Transcript of September 16, 2015, Debtors
Examination at R., pp. 113-140. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 36(d)(4) provides that "the
deponent... may move to tenninate or limit it [the deposition] on the grounds that it is being
conducted in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses or oppresses the
deponent." Pursuant to I.R.C.P 30(d)(4)(B), the deponent may then suspend the deposition to
obtain a protective order under Rule 26( c). During the oral examination, the Debtor and his
counsel refused to answer many relevant questions on the grounds that that the questions asked
were regarding the assets or operations of corporate entities that are not parties to the action even though the infonnation was within the Debtor's personal knowledge and even when it
involved actions that the Debtor may have personally taken or directed. See Transcript of
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6,

at

5

1

this was not an

objection that allowed the Debtor to refuse to answer under I.R.C.P. 30(d)(l). Moreover, the
Debtor did not obtain a protective order under Rules 30(d)(4)(A) and 26.
Consequently, because the Debtor refused to answer relevant questions, without
appropriate objections or a protective order during an oral examination, a motion to compel
under Rule 37 was appropriate. Rule 37 provides that a motion to compel discovery may be
made if "a deponent fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31." I.R.C.P.
37(a)(3)(A)(i).

Rule 37 also provides that an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or

response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer or respond. The following table shows
references to the Debtor's exam transcript where the Debtor failed to answer questions within his
knowledge about the operations or assets of CYB master, or any of its subsidiaries of Wechsler
& Co., or of the target companies. (Pages and lines refer to the Transcript pages. The Transcript
can be found in the Record at pp. 113-140).
p.14:1.15

p.17: 1.1

p.19:1.5

p.25: 1.11

p.26: 1.6

p.28: 1.7

pp. 29-31

pp. 31-33

p.36 1.5

p.41: 1.8

p.42: 1.6

p.54: 1.7

p. 59: 1. 9

p. 67: 1. 7

p.71:1.17

p.72: 1.15

p.73: 1. 17

p.75: 1.4

p.76: 1.8

p.79: 1.1

p.79: 1.25

p.100: 1.20

p. 101: 1. 13

I p.77: 1.9

I

p.102: 1.4

A quick skim of the debtor's examination transcript makes it obvious that Debtor was
also evasive or gave incomplete answers throughout the examination. As seen above, pursuant

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Page 18

a

to the Debtor's refusal to answer questions during his oral examination as a judgment debtor.
\Vhile a motion for contempt is one available remedy for a judgement debtor's refusal to answer
examination questions, it is not the only one. Rule 69 clearly defines a debtor's examination as
discovery to be governed under Rule 26 and Rule 30 discovery rules and procedures, which
allow a court to grant a motion to compel when the deponent/judgment debtor does not comply.
Furthennore, the Debtor's contention that there was no meet and confer between the
parties, and therefore the district judge's grant of the motion to compel was error, is not
supported by fact or law. See Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 9-10. As seen in the debtor
examination transcript, referenced in the table above, the Creditor posed her questions to the
Debtor through a debtor's examination/deposition. At advice of counsel, the Debtor refused to
answer and was evasive throughout the deposition. Counsel for the two paiiies discussed at great
length, both on and off the record, the appropriateness of the questions and the Debtor's
objections to them. The Debtor continued to refuse to answer them. Certainly this was a
discussion between the parties that qualified as a meet and confer inasmuch as the paiiies were
attempting to resolve the issues without involving the court.
Next, in an effort to acquire the relevant infonnation without involving the cmui, the
Creditor served a Subpoena Duces Tecum on the Debtor for documents in Defendant's
possession concerning the various corporate entities. R., pp. 141-44. In an October 14, 2015,
letter, counsel for Debtor again refused to produce the documents, claiming, again that the
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a

"

R.,

150.
In an effort to avoid seeking court intervention, on December 8, 2015, Creditor's counsel
wrote to Debtor's counsel and attempted to nan-ow the requests:
As you are aware, discovery in post judgment proceedings is allowed in aid of the
judgment or execution. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 45(b) as well as I.R.C.P. 34(a) the
person to whom the request is directed (Nonnan J. Wechsler) shall produce or
pennit inspection and copying of the books, papers, documents, and/or
electronically stored infonnation which are in the possession, custody or control
of the party upon whom the request is served. Of course the rules also allow the
paiiy to whom the request is served upon to allow the requesting party entry upon
the property of whom the request is served for the purpose of inspecting the
designated object or property. As I am sure you are aware, the law is pointedly
clear that the production requirements include producing documents that are
under your client's control. Mr. \Vechsler is required to produce the documents,
tangible things and/or electronically stored information that is in his possession,
custody or for which he has a legal right to obtain upon demand.
Creditor's counsel then requested that Debtor respond to only two of the six items to which he
had previously objected. Creditor explained why, in light of the law, a response was required:
In his debtor's exam, Mr. \Vechsler testified regarding his various roles and
involvement in these companies. \Ve are specificaIIy requesting any and aII
documents, tangible materials and/or electronic data that is in his possession,
custody or control or which he has a legal right to obtain upon demand ....
In his debtor's examination, Mr. Wechsler testified that he is a director of
Intellicorp and that the computer in his home is owned by Intellicorp. Mr.
Wechsler also testified that he keeps some of his personal business records on the
computer. Because he is in possession, custody or control of this computer for
which he has a legal right to access, including the data and infonnation located
thereon, we are requesting he provide to us all information located thereon
pertaining to his business records, financial affairs or assets in ai1y way. \Ve are

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

20

~

~IB

ill

to pennit us access to the computer for the purpose of inspecting the computer to
investigate the financial infonnation located thereon pertaining to Mr. \Vechsler.

R., pp. 152-53. Counsel for Debtor responded on January 7, 2016, arguing without citation to
rule, statute, or precedent that the Debtor was not obligated to tum over infonnation or
documents in his possession about a corporate entity that he controls. R., pp. 154-55.
The above letters and correspondence were also valid meet and confer efforts, and the
district court's grant of the Creditor's motion to compel was both correct and within the court's
discretion.
Debtor's contention that he did not receive a notice of deposition before the Rule 69
debtor's examination is also misleading and not supported by the facts. See Appellant's Opening
Brief, p. 9. On September 2, 2015,Creditor did file a Afotion for Order for Examination of
Defendant, pursuant to Idaho Code § 11-501 ("Order for Examination of Defendant" or Idaho's
"Debtor Exam" statute). On September 2, 2015 the district judge signed an Amended Order for
Debtor's exam, which was sent to Debtor's counsel ofrecord. R., pp. 42-43.
Finally, Debtor's argument that a subpoena duces tecum is also not discovery, and may
not be enforced by a Rule 37 motion to compel is not supported by law. See Appellant's Opening
Brief, p. 8. A Rule 45 subpoena duces tecum is simply another method to obtain discovery
documents. If a party fails to comply without justifiable cause, all remedies may be taken against
him, including a motion to compel. Indeed Rule 45 contemplates that a motion to compel may be
sought by the opposing party for lack of compliance. See I.R.C.P. 45(e)(l)(D).
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The rules of discovery, including those for depositions and subpoenas clearly apply to debtor
examinations and post-judgment proceedings. Consequently, the Court should affinn the district
court's May 11, 2016, decision, granting Creditor's Motion to Compel.
B.

,vHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT'S APPOINTMENT OF AN ANCILLARY
RECEIVER ,vAS PROPER?
Debtor's response brief to the district comi presented no argument and cited no authority

that stands for the proposition that the district court lacked, authority to appoint an ancillary
receiver. See R., pp. 181-86. "It is by now a well established rule in Idaho that review on appeal
is limited to those issues raised before the lower tribunal and that an appellate court \Vill not
decide issues presented for the first time on appeal."

Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. Of

Comm 'rs, 110 Idaho 37, 40, 714 P.2d 6, 9 (1986). See also, ,\![asters v. State, 105 Idaho 197,668

P.2d 73 (1983)(an appellant is held to the theories on which a cause was tried in the lower comi
and may not raise additional or new theories on appeal); International Business Machines C01p.
v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194,677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984)(even if issue was arguably raised in

the lower tribunal under liberal interpretation of pleadings, if not supp01ied by any factual
showing or by submission of legal authority, it was not presented for lower court's decision and
would not be considered on appeal.).

Because Debtor failed to argue and/or support the

argument in his briefing to the district court that the comi was without authority to appoint an
ancillary receiver, he is not entitled to raise the argument on appeal and this Court should not
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event

was

district court, Creditor presents the following argument in support of the district court's decision.
The district court acted in accordance with Idaho law when it appointed the ancillary
receiver in this matter. Idaho Code § 8-601 provides that a receiver may be appointed "by the
court in which an action is pending or has passed to judgment, or by the judge thereof:
1.

In an action ... by a creditor to subject any property or fund to his claim

3. After judgment to carry the judgment into effect.
4. After judgment to dispose of the property according to the judgment, or to
preserve it dming the pendency of an appeal, or in proceedings in aid of
execution, when an execution has been returned unsatisfied, or when the
judgment debtor refuses to apply his property in satisfaction of the judgment.

6. In all other cases where receivers have heretofore been appointed by the
usages of courts of equity.
Idaho Code §8-601 (Michie 2016). "The power to appoint a receiver is very largely in the
discretion of the trial comi, and an appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of such
discretion except in cases of palpable abuse." Northwestern & Pac. Hypotheek v. Dalton, 44
Idaho 120, 124, 256 P. 93, 95 (1927).
The concept of appointing a local or ancillary receiver to assist a receiver who has been
appointed by a foreign court, is well established in courts of equity. "In granting an anciilary
receivership the court ordinarily looks at nothing except the pendency of a proceeding in the
parent distiict, the appointment there of a receiver, and the presence of assets in the district
where the application is made." In Re Hayes, 192 F. 1018 (Dist. Ct. S.D. New York, 1912). See
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1

utilized as well.) See also generally Ralph
Receivers,

3rd

1
Clark, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of

Ed., Section 318. An ancillary receiver is appointed by a court in a jurisdiction

other than that appointing the primary receiver. The ancillary receiver is not the agent or deputy
of the primary receiver. The ancillary receiver answers to the local comi which made the
appointment, and is directed to take possession of the debtor's property and, at the order of the
local court, remit it to the court with 01iginal jmisdiction over the matter. Clark on Receivers, §
318.

Accordingly, appointment of an ancillary receiver is authorized by Idaho Code § 8601(6), supra.

Because the appointment of the ancillary receiver is based on an action filed

locally - in this case, the filing of a foreign judgment - it is generally considered that the
approp1iate person to request appointment of an ancillary receiver is the original plaintiff, not the
primary receiver. Clark on Receivers, § 320.1.
In this instance, Debtor's principal assets are two holding compames: a New York
corporation, \Vechsler & Co., which is currently in Chapter 11 bankruptcy; and a Delaware
limited liability company, CYB Master LLC.

These entities directly or indirectly own

significant interests in four small corporations which may have significant value. Virtually the
entirety of Debtor's significant net worth is tied up in these two holding companies and their debt
and equity stakes in the four corporations. However, Debtor, though previously ordered by the
New York court to relinquish control of the entities' property, materials, and infonnation he
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to turn over
infonnation.
Per the Record herein, the equity holdings of Debtor and/or the entities he controls or has
an interest in as of August 18, 2010, were:
RAVELLC
Wechsler & Company

32,367,112 Common Units

725 Preferred Units

CYBRAVELLC

3,262,387 Common Units

1100 Preferred Units

Nonnan Wechsler

625,948 at 0.0998485/unit \Varrants

INTELLICORP
Wechsler & Co., Inc. 998,200.00 Equity/Shares $6,707,000.00 Loan/Notes $158,058.54
Interest
CYB IC LLC 200,000.00 Equity/Shares $1,218,000.00 Loan/Notes $17,926.37 Interest

PERMLIGHT PRODUCTS, INC.
Wechsler & Co., Inc.

95 Shares Series A Preferred 1750 Shares Series A-1 Preferred

CYB Penn LLC

1204 Shares Series A Preferred 715 Shares Series A-1 Preferred

Nonnan J. Wechsler

16 Shares Series A-1 Preferred

R., pp. 94-104.

Charts detailing these interests are set forth below for the court's convenience:

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Page 25

\
l'

PermH2ht
Products,
lnc,

B
No:man Wec:lsler

Vt/echsler & Co.

Permlight
Products, lnc.

Rave LLC

inte!!i::::orp, lnc_

R.,p. 77.

In May 2013, the New York Supreme Court issued its order appointing Joseph B. Nelson,
CPA, of the accounting finn ofBerdon LLP, New York, NY as receiver for Debtor's interests in
CYB Master LLC. Although the Receiver is, by court order, the sole member of CYB Master
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and possession that he was previously ordered to turn over to the primary New York receiver,
but

not and continues to refuse to do so. Debtor maintains in his home in Pocatello the

business records of CYB Master and of the related limited liability companies it controls. He has
in his possession documents, computer files, bank records, and other assets that should be
handed over to the receiver. In addition, the Debtor has access to bank accounts that are part of
the Receivership Estate.
It is clear the District Comi had authority to appoint an ancillary receiver under the

circumstances presented here. The Idaho receivership statutes confer authority on the court to
appoint a receiver to receive and take charge of notes, accounts, certificates of the capital stock
of corporations and choses in action, and other personal property, where the necessity and
occasion for such appointment is shown. Utah Association of Credit Men v. Budge, 16 Idaho
751, 754-56 (1909). Creditor is attempting to satisfy a judgment. Execution has been returned
unsatisfied, and Debtor refuses to apply his property in satisfaction of the judgment, even though
he appears to control property sufficient to do so.

The district court's appointment of an

ancillary receiver was proper.
1. Payment of ancillary receiver's fees and costs.

Similarly, the court did not c01mnit error when it ordered, as did the New York comi, that
Creditor pay the ancillary receiver's fees, costs, and expenses. "The district court appointing the
receiver has discretion over who will pay the costs of the receiver." SEC v. Elliott, 953 F.2d
1560, 1576 (U.S. Ct. App. 11 111 Cir., 1992). "Some comis have held that the receiver's right to
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lS

consent

proceedings. Perhaps it is more accurate to say there is an implied understanding that the court
which appointed him and whose officer he is will protect his right to be paid for his services, to
be reimbursed for his proper costs and expenses.

Or simply, those who benefit from a

receivership should pay for that benefit." Id. (internal citations omitted.) See also, US. v.
Guess, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14237, 12, 13 (U.S. Dist. Ct. S. Dist. CA, 2005).

In the New York order appointing the Receiver, with regard to payment of his fees, the
court ordered, "Plaintiff (sic) Sharon Wechsler shall be responsible for paying the Receiver's
fees and expenses to the extent they exceed the Receivership Property available to make such
payments." R., p. 61. Similarly, the Idaho court held, "All compensation shall be paid by the
Plaintiff, who may seek leave from this Court or from the New York Court to recover those
expenses from property obtained from the Defendant." R., pp. 209-10.
Creditor sought the appointment of a local, Ancillary Receiver. The court appointed the
Ancillary Receiver as its "m111," to assist in the locating, seizing and documenting the property,
materials, computer files, and infonnation in Debtor's possession in his home in Pocatello, Idaho
as they relate to CYB Master LLC. The court's order requiring Creditor to pay the fees and
expenses of the Ancillary Receiver was a usual and customary exercise of the comi' s discretion
and the court was well within its bounds to impose such an order. The Creditor was seeking the
appointment; the ancillary receiver has a right to be compensated, and the court's ordering
payment by Creditor, which may be recovered from property obtained from Debtor, was a proper
exercise of discretion.
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to serve
A receiver serving without bond is a discretionary matter detennined by the trial court.
"To detennine whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court evaluates whether the
district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with relevant legal standards; and (3) reached its
decision by an exercise of reason." Slaven v. Slaven, 2016 Ida. LEXIS 337, *6 (2016). Similar
to the New York court, the district comi in this matter appropriately exercised its discretion
through sound reasoning and application of law and did not require the Ancillary Receiver serve
pursuant to the posting of a bond. Idaho Code § 8-604 allows the comi to exercise its discretion
relative to the posting of a bond. This statute provides, "Before entering upon his duties the
receiver must be sworn to perfonn them faithfully, and with one (1) or more sureties, approved
by the court or judge, execute an undertaking, to such person and in such sum as the court or
judge may direct. ... " Idaho Code§ 8-604 (Michie 2016). Said otherwise, the court may direct
a sum certain for a bond, or none at all. The exercise of this discretion to not require the posting
of a bond by a receiver is common and solely within the discretion of the comi. See SEC v.
Bivona, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142002 *24, (U.S. Dist. Ct. N. Dist. CA, San Francisco Div.,

2016), Ruppersberger v. Ramos, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99106 *8 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Dist. HA,
2015). The court in this case did not error when it properly exercised its discretion and followed
the lead of the New York court and appointed the Ancillary Receiver to serve without bond.
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,vHETHER
ORDERS AND ,vruTS PROTECTED DEBTOR'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
First, the Debtor raised the constitutional issues of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights for the first time in his Objection and Response to Plaint(ff's Proposed Order
Appointing Ancillia,y Receiver, filed May 24, 2016 - after the district court had already issued

the May 11, 2016, and May 24, 2016, orders that are the subject of this appeal. R., p. 212.
Debtor did not file a motion for reconsideration or seek alternative relief. The Debtor did not
raise constitutional issues in his briefing or oral argument to the court below, and consequently,
the district court did not consider or decide any constitutional issues. Accordingly, this Comi
should not consider these issues for the first time on appeal. See Afurray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho
99, 101-02, 106 P.3d 425, 427-28 (2005) (holding that appellate court will not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal, but also noting exception that "constitutional issues may be
considered for the first time on appeal if such consideration is necessary for subsequent
proceedings in the case."). Further, there are no subsequent proceedings in this case - judgment
has been obtained and Creditor is simply seeking to execute on such judgment. Therefore, the
constitutional issues raised by the Debtor on appeal should not be considered by this Court.
However, if this Court proceeds to address the Debtor's arguments, then the Court should
affinn the district comi's orders because the Debtor's arguments that the district court's orders
and writs violated his constitutional rights are not supp01ied by fact or law.
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and
seizure does not apply.

against

search and

The Debtor's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights protecting against unlawful and
unreasonable searches and seizures are not applicable to the present, post-judgment enforcement
of a civil order. The Fourth Amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no \Varrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affinnation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
However, the Fourth Amendment is applicable to a debtor only where (1) the actor is acting as
an instrument or agent of the government; and (2) the debtor has a legitimate p1ivacy interest
with respect to the prope1iy. In Re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004).
Under the first prong, the Fourth Amendment generally does not protect against
unreasonable intrusions by private parties. In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2004), citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 65 L. Ed. 1048, 41 S. Ct. 574 (1921).
The Fourth Amendment does apply, however, "to the conduct of private parties acting as
instruments or agents of the govennnent." In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2004), citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022
(1971). To "detennine whether a private individual is acting as a governmental instrument or
agent for Fourth Amendment purposes" the following two-part test is applied: "(1) whether the
govennnent knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct; and (2) whether the private party
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or

own

"

re
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263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004), citing United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928,931 (9th Cir. 1994).
To satisfy the second prong, a person claiming a violation of the Fourth Amendment
must show that a defendant "acted with the intent to assist the govennnent in its investigatory or
administrative purpose, and not for an independent purpose." In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 264-65
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004), citing Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 924
(9th Cir. 2001). In several instances, the Ninth Circuit has refused to apply the Fourth
Amendment because of a legitimate independent motivation of the private party that engaged in
the challenged conduct. In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 264 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004), citing United
States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982) (search of the defendant's residence by a

private party for the purpose of recovering stolen property); United States v. Chulnvubike, 956
F.2d 209, 212-13 (9th Cir. 1992) (intrusive medical procedures used by a physician in order to
protect the defendant's health and safety); United States v. Gomez, 614 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir.
1979) (search of misplaced luggage by an airline employee for the purpose of identifying the
owner).
Finally, "the involvement of government officials does not necessarily transfonn private
conduct into a government search or seizure." In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 264 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2004), citing Chulcwubike, 956 F.2d at 212-13. "[E]specially... where the purpose of the
government presence is to ensure the safety of the private party and not to "reap the benefits" of
the search or seizure." In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 264 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004), citing Miller, 688
F.2d at 658.
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court

the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unlawful search and seizures did not apply to a
bankruptcy trustee that was charged with assembling and liquidating the assets of an estate for
the benefit of creditors. 311 B.R. 256, (BAnkr. C.D. Cal. 2004). The Kerlo Court held that
"[t]rustees in bankruptcy are not law enforcement officials" and "[a]lthough trustees may seek
the assistance of govenunental officials in carrying out their statutory and fiduciary duties and
orders of the court, they do not act to assist the govenm1ent in its investigatory or administrative
activities." Rather, trustees in bankruptcy cases, "act independently under their statutory mandate
in the Bankruptcy Code." Id.; See also, In re Bodeker, No. 12-60137-7, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS
2336, at *34-35 (U.S. Bankr. D. Mont. June 7, 2013) (A trustee searched a plaintiff's home "to
further her own ends and for a legitimate independent motivation, i.e., to satisfy her trustee
duties .... "). A trustee may seek out assistance from a law enforcement officer to assist her in
"carrying out her statutory and fiduciary duties to creditors of the estate." ." In re Kerlo, 311
B.R. 256, 265 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004). Therefore, the "trustee has a legitimate, statutory,
independent reason for enforcing the Orders." Id.; See also In re Bodeker, No. 12-60137-7, 2013
Bankr. LEXIS 2336, at *34-35 (U.S. Bankr. D. Mont. June 7, 2013) ("The involvement of the
deputy sheriff on civil standby did not transfonn [a trustee's] private conduct into a govermnent
search or seizure"). 2

See Spacone v. Burke(In re Truck-A-Way), 300 B.R. 31, 38 (E.D. Cal. 2003) for contrary authority applying the
Fourth Amendment to a bankruptcy trustee's actions to search a home to gather assets of an estate. However, as
Kerio notes, Truck-a-Way relies on Taunt v. Barman (In re Bannan), 252 B.R. 403,413 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000)
2
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to

case

present case,

an

duty and

interest in gathering the assets of the judgement-debtor and all documents and other items that
will lead to the assets of the judgment debtor to satisfy comi-ordered judgments and distribute
those assets to the rightful creditors. Although the Ancillary Receiver in this case was assisted
by a Bannock County Sheriff, it did not tum the Ancillary Receiver's actions into government
actions. The deputy was there only to guarantee the safety of the Ancillary Receiver. However,
the Ancillary Receiver was acting independently of the government, and was not assisting the
govennnent in its investigatory or administrative duties. The govenunent reaped no benefit by
the receiver's actions. Consequently, because the receiver was a private actor, the Debtor's
Fourth Amendment 1ights could not have been violated because the Fourth Amendment did not
apply.
The Fourth Amendment additionally did not apply to the Debtor's documents and things
because the Debtor did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in those items. "To invoke
the Fourth Amendment protections, a person must show a legitimate expectation of privacy." In

re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 265-66 (Bank:r. C.D. Cal. 2004), citing Smith v. ~Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979). "A legitimate expectation of privacy requires both
(a) a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy."
Id. Courts apply the following four-factor test to decide whether a person has a legitimate
expectation of privacy:

without considering at all the Fourth Amendment principles on this matter previously determined by the Ninth
Circuit and discussed in the Creditor's brief above.
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has a proprietary or possessory
the place
searched or property to be seized, (2) whether the person has the right to exclude
others from the premises, (3) whether the person has taken nom1al precautions to
maintain his or her privacy, and (4) 'Whether the person is legitimately on the
premises.
In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 265-66 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004), citing United States v. Cella, 568

F .2d 1266, 1280 (9th Cir. 1977). Kerlo held that a debtor has a "significantly reduced
expectation of privacy in their "houses, papers, and effects" because of the requirement of
substantial and detailed disclosures in a bankruptcy proceeding. Additionally, In re Bodeker, No.
12-60137-7, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2336, at *46 (U.S. Bankr. D. Mont. June 7, 2013), the
bankruptcy court held that a debtor's "failure to disclose the gold and silver and other assets in
his bankruptcy schedules significantly reduced his expectation of p1ivacy in his residence ... "
Consequently, ''under the totality of the circumstances ... , even if a defendant could demonstrate
a subjective expectation of privacy in the residence or specific property seized, 'this expectation
of privacy is not one that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate' because the defendant
should have disclosed the property in his bankruptcy proceedings." Id., citing United States of
America v. Burke, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4762, 2009 \VL 173829*10 (E.D. Cal.). The Bodeker

Court finally explained that "it is therefore troubling that the defendant seeks to assert a
legitimate expectation of privacy in documents that he was required by law to expose to the
public." Id.
Similar to the Kerlo and Bodeker cases, the Debtor in the present case does not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his papers and documents related to his financial interests,
including the interests he has in Wechsler & Company and CYB Masters, LLC. The Debtor has a
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requirement to answer

truthfully during a debtor's examination. Additionally, the Debtor failed to disclose bis interests
in the above-named companies, despite being ordered by the court to do so. Consequently
society is not prepared to recognize the Debtor's claimed expectation of privacy in this instance.
Because the Ancillary Receiver was not a state actor or an agent of a state actor when he
attempted to execute on the writ of assistance in this matter and also because the Debtor did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy, the Debtor's Fourth Amendment rights against
unlawful search and seizure were not violated. This Court should confinn the district comi' s
Order to Compel, Order Granting Ancilliary Receiver, and Order for Granting \V1it of
Assistance.
2. The Debtor's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process rights were not
violated in this post-judgment proceeding.

The Debtor's due process rights also were not violated. The Debtor contends that the
Writ of Assistance was unlawful because he was not given notice of it or a hearing. However, the
Writ of Assistance was issued as a post-judgment execution matter. The Debtor has already had
a hearing and the oppmiunity to be heard, which resulted in the judgments against him. If every
debtor were given notice that his property was going to be garnished, levied against, or executed
on, then it would make collection on a judgment nearly impossible. In Wyshak v. Wyslzak, a
California appellate court explained:
In the early case of Endicott-Johnson Co,p. v. Encyclopedia Press (1924) 266
U.S. 285, 288 [69 L.Ed. 288, 291-292, 45 S.Ct. 61], the United States Supreme
Court considered the issue of whether post-judgment garnishment
procedure, available to a judgment creditor without further notice of hearing
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to a judgment
·was
due process
The Endicott court
held that due process did not require that notice and opportunity for hearing
be afforded a judgment debtor before post-judgment garnishment ·was
effectuated. Endicott has not been overruled.
70 CaL App. 3d 384, 388, 138 Cal. Rptr. 811, 813 (1977) (Internal citations Omitted. Emphasis
added). Wyshak also held that it knew "of no authority holding that, after judgment, due process
of law requires that additional oppo1tunities for notice and hearing must be offered a judgment
debtor. .. before execution may be levied." Id.; See also, Brill v. Brill, 905 So. 2d 948, 953 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Distinguishing between pre-judgment and post-judgment garnishment to
hold that "due process does not require 'prior notice to a judgment debtor and a hearing before a
w1it of gamislunent).
The Debtor's arguments that he was not given due process before the issuance of the \Vrit
of Assistance simply lacks merit. The Debtor was given all the process that he was due before
the original judgments were issued. He then had an additional opportunity to be heard at the
hearing on the motion to compel. The district court properly granted the Creditor's motion to
compel. The Debtor has cited to no authority that would afford him additional process before the
Debtor was entitled to execute on the judgments or enforce the motion to compel through a
court-ordered Writ of Assistance.
3. The Debtor's First Amendment rights have not been violated.

The First Amendment does not apply to the present case, and indeed, the Debtor has cited
to no authority in support of his First Amendment claim. (See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 28).
Debtor argues that because the Creditor has requested the Debtor's passwords and emails, the
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opinions will

chilled.

already been

ordered and given opportunity to produce his relevant, business documents. His failure to
comply with court orders certainly reduces his First Amendment rights in the same manner that it
reduces his Fourth Amendment rights. He can also seek a protective order to protect non-reievant
information that goes to his political and personal opinions. He should not be allowed to continue
hiding relevant business documents for the mere reason that they may be stored with or among
non-relevant documents that go to his political or personal opinions.
Debtor's argument that the receiver might obtain documents that are subject to attorneyclient privilege and would therefore also chill his speech goes to the matter of privilege rather
than matters regarding constitutional rights. Again, the Debtor has had ample opportunity to
produce his records pertaining to his interests in the above-discussed businesses. If he had
complied v..ith his duties and court orders, he could have easily retained privileged information.
Second, the Debtor has had sufficient opportunity to seek a protective order to protect privileged
information that might also be stored electronically or in hard-copy form with other nonprivileged documents but has chosen not to do this as well. The Debtor should not be permitted
to hide behind the First Amendment or privileges to withhold other relevant, and court-ordered
documents from production to the Creditor.
D.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEBTOR THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER I.R.C.P. 37(A)(S)(B)?

A motion to compel was the proper remedy and was properly granted by the district court
in response to Debtor's failure to answer relevant questions at the debtor examination and to
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did
discovery - throug._li. a debtor's exam under Rule 69, which as stated in rule 69 is governed "by
these rules" - and not solely by Idaho Code, Chapter 11. A debtor's exam is a deposition
governed by Rule 30

as conceded by the Debtor in his brief. See Appellant's Brief, p. 9.

"I.R.C.P. 69 explicitly allows for examination of the judgment debtor. This process is generally
referred to as a deposition and is governed by I.R.C.P. 30". A deposition is the first discovery
method listed under Rule 26. Failure to comply with discovery is enforceable pursuant to a Rule
37 motion to compel. The Debtor is not entitled to attorney fees under Rule 37(a)(5)(B) because
the district court properly exercised his discretion in granting the Creditor's motion.
E.

\VHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEBTOR'S
MOTIONS TO STRIKE.

The district court did not improperly consider hearsay, unsubstantiated and scandalous
infom1ation without foundation in its May 11th and May 24111 orders, and consequently the district
court properly denied the Debtor's motions to strike. Debtor particularly objected to the Affidavit
of Louis E. Black in Support of Motion to Compel, contending that because Mr. Black did not
receive or send the letters, emails, and documents attached to his affidavit, they were hearsay and
lacked foundation. The Debtor conceded that "in the discovery process, not all requested
material is required to be admissible." See Appellant's Brief, p. 25. However, the Debtor then
contended that the district court improperly considered Mr. Black's affidavit and the documents
attached thereto because the matters being considered in the Court's May 11th and May 24th
orders were not discovery matters. Id. As shown in the Creditor's brief, supra, this argument is
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Civil Procedure as stated in I.R.C.P. 69. A deposition is discovery and is the proper subject of a
motion to compel if the deponent fails to answer examination questions. Consequently, Mr.
Black's affidavit was filed in support of the Creditor's motion to compel and in pursuit of
discovery. In denying the Debtor's motion, the dist1ict judge explained: "it is not ground for
objection that the infonnation sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the infonnation sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." I.R.C.P. 26(b )(1 ).
R., p. 202. Therefore, the district court properly explained that the Debtor's Rule 56(e) and Rule

12(f) motions lacked merit because the district court did not consider the evidence as it applied to
trial, and because "Black's affidavit was given to aid in the discovery process." R., p. 203.
Next, the district comi did not abuse its discretion in denying the Debtor's motion to
strike portions of the memorandmn. As the district court emphasized, because a party disagrees
with the facts or law that is in the opposing party's b1ief does not make it "redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous" material. Id. The Debtor provided no valid argument or
authority as to why his motion to strike the memorandum should be granted, and the district
court properly denied his motion.
Finally, a judge's decision to grant a motion to compel responses in a debtor's
examination as a creditor attempts to conduct discovery in a post-judgment proceeding and the
district court's refusal to grant Debtor's frivolous motions to stay do not demonstrate emotion or
a lack of reason. Rather, the court's decision simply reflects the court would not tolerate the
Debtor's continued efforts to avoid collection of his debt.
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WHETHER THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD THERE WAS NOT A
CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN CREDITOR AND ANCILLARY
RECEIVER?
As addressed hereinabove, the district court was well within its authority and exercised
its reasoned discretion appropriately when it appointed the ancillary receiver in this case. In that
Order the district court commanded, "All parties to this action are ordered to cooperate with and
assist the Ancillary Receiver in taking possession of the property described above." R., p. 209.
On June 16, 2016 the ancillary receiver, accompanied by the Bannock County Sheriff, attempted
to obtain the court ordered property of the Debtor or that property that was within his possession
and/or control belonging to CYB Master LLC or the other third party entities related thereto, at
Debtor's home.
The Debtor did not give the Ancillary Receiver any of the Court ordered documents,
materials or objects and Debtor refused to allow the Ancillary Receiver to enter his home.
Augmented R., 16.06.20 Affidavit of Ancillary Receiver in Support of Motion for Contempt,

,r,r

4-5. On June 20, 2016 Plaintiff filed her Motion for Contempt and a Ex Parte Motion to Shorten
Time, Augmented R., 16.06.20 Motionfor Contempt, Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time. In the
caption of those documents it reads that they identify counsel for Creditor to also be counsel for
Ancillary Receiver, David M. Smith. Id. In the body of the Motion for Contempt as well as the
Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time it also states that the Ancillary Receiver is represented by

counsel for Plaintiff. These pleadings misidentify Creditor's counsel's role in this matter as they
relate to the Ancillary Receiver.
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the court ordered the parties to cooperate
Receiver. The ancillary receiver alleged the Debtor refused to cooperate with the Ancillary
Receiver through his alleged refusal to provide documentation, materials and other objects to the
Ancillary Receiver on June 16, 2016. In that the court docket was silent as to Debtor selfreporting his alleged refusal to cooperate with the Ancillary Receiver, Creditor's counsel,
pursuant to the Court's order for all parties to cooperate, filed the Motion for Contempt and the
related documents submitted therewith.
Debtor argued to the court that a conflict of interest exists bet\veen Creditor's counsel
and the Ancillary Receiver because the Creditor is paying the Ancillary Receiver and that the
Ancillary Receiver is being represented by Creditor's counsel in this case. Creditor's counsel
does not represent the Ancillary Receiver in this matter, nor has a Notice of Appearance pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 4.1 been entered by Creditor's counsel on behalf of the Ancillary Receiver. The
Ancillary Receiver is in this case through court order as an officer of the court and is required to
answer to the comi. See generally R., p. 201. The Motion for Contempt and the associated
documents submitted therewith were filed by Creditor's counsel as a means of providing notice
to the court, only, of Debtor's alleged failure to comply with the court's order.
The issue regarding the Creditor's payment of fees and expenses has already been
addressed hereinabove. Regarding Debtor's claim of conflict due to alleged representation by
Creditor's counsel, the comi did not commit error when it held:
Counsel for Plaintiff does not represent the receiver in this action nor does the law
finn of Racine Olsen Nye Budge & Bailey, Chartered represent him or his
accounting firm in their appointment in this case. Counsel represent Plaintiff.
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an
judgment she has against Defendant.

to

a

While it is true that a receiver is not represented by either attorney in a
case in which he or she has been appointed, sometimes legal and procedural
matters must be undertaken in their behalf. If such arises, the receiver should not
be expected to go out and retain private counsel in order to effectuate the orders
of the Court.
In this case, the so called "representation" only occurred as a result of
Defendant's alleged contempt. The receiver would not have needed any
representation but for Defendant's conduct. Vv1Iile it may have been better to
come directly to the Court, because the Court can initiate contempt charges, the
maimer the receiver undertook does not preclude action or create a conflict of
interest. Contempt was alleged. Defendant is celiainly not going to file such
charges. The fact that Plaintiffs attorney filed charges based on laiowledge fiwn
the receiver on behalf of his client regarding the incident does not mean that
Plaintiffs attorney represents the receiver. As such, no conflict of interest exists
in relation to representation.

Decision Re: Conflict ofInterest, Oct. 3, 2016, pp. 4-5.
Accordingly, the court's decision was well reasoned and correct.

The court did not

co1mnit error in denying Debtor's allegation that a conflict existed between counsel for Creditor
and the ancillary receiver.

G.

\VHETHER CREDITOR IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL?
Creditor is entitled to her attorney fees in defending against this appeal. Attorney fees are

granted on appeal when the appellate court is "left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Berkshire Invs., LLC v.

Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 87, 278 P.3d 943, 957 (2012). The Debtor's arguments in support of its
appeal are not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. Debtor has sought this appeal
with the sole purpose to cause Creditor to incur additional legal fees and to prolong this litigation
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so as to enable

to

to evade collection

the judgments

him. See

I.A.R. 11.2, [A.R. 41. See also, Jim & ,\1aryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner, 2015 Ida. LEXIS

11, 20, 342 P.3d 639, 648 (2015) (Client and counsel both held responsible for payment of
attorney fees on appeal since they advanced arguments that are without basis in law or fact.)
Consequently, the Court should grant Creditor her attorney fees in this appeal.

VI. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing, Creditor respectfully requests the Comi affinn the district
comi's May 11, 2016 Decision on Motion to Compel, A1otion to Appoint Receiver and .Motions
to Strike; May 24, 2016 Order Appointing Ancillary Receiver; and October 3, 2016 Decision Re:
Co11flict ofInterest.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of January, 2017.
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE &
BAILEY, CHARTERED

y;I.
______

By: _ _ _ _

STEPHEN J. MUHONEN
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